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SOMETHING ABOUT NEGLIGENCE
When Negligence Is Not A Cause
A may complain of B's negligence, only when it has
caused some injury to A's person or property. Being
negligent mentally, acting negligently, is not reprehended, unless some injurious consequence can be traced to it.
In A's action gainst B, therefore, a fundamental task is
to show the c.sual bond between what B did, or failed
to do, and the injury, as well as the negligent quality of
such act or omission.1 B, a mine owner, was negligent in
permitting an electrically charged wire to be uninsulated
for two months; A, employed in the mine was without
negligence on his part, killed in the mine. No recovery
by the widow was allowed because it was not shown
"that tihe defendant's negligence was the cause of her
husband's death, or that he died from electric shock."'
When A would, had he been duly observant, have seen
and heard an approaching trolley, with which he collided,
its excessive speed would have been material, otherwise not, since it could not have conduced to the collision.
B contracted with A to maintain an electrical arrangement by which, if burglary were committed, warning
would be given to B, who was at once to dispatch a man
'Erbe v. R. T. Co. 256 Pa. 567, Nirdlinger v. Am. Co. 245
Pa., 453. Wallace v. Auto Co. 239 Pa. 110. Glancy v. Borough;
243 Pa. 216.
Caddy v. Coal Co. 261 Pa. 20.
'Jordon v. R. T. Co. 260 Pa. 275.
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to the place to interrupt the burglar's work. B's neglecting to maintain the electrical connection, or to dispatch
a man, on notice of the burglary, is not the cause of the
loss arising from the theft. Stewart, J., finds, "Certainly there is nothing in the case from which a legal inference could be derived that the loss would have been averted, had the electrical alarm been in order."'
UNITY OF CAUSE
Occasionally remarks occur that the defemtdnt, in order to be responsible, must have been the sole cause.
"The burden," says Frazer, J.,' was on the plaintiff (in
a case of collision with a trolley car,) to show that defendant's negligent act was the sole and proximate
cause of the death of his wife, to the exclusion of other
causes." There are no single causes of anything. In
ns Lectures on Metaphysics, Sir William Hamilton remharks,' "Of second causes, I say there nust almost always be at least a concurrence of two to constitute an effect. Take the example of vapor.
Here to say that
heat is the cause of evaporation is a very inaccurateat least a very inadequate expression.
Water is as
much the cause of evaporation as heat. But heat and
*water together are the causes of the phenomenon." In
his Discussions on Philosophy, page 584, he again observes, "It would be here out of place to refute the error of
philosophers, in supposing that anything can have a
single cause :-meaning always by a cause, that without
which the effect would not have been." But the authorNirdlinger v. Tel. do. 245 Pa. 453.
'Erbe v. Transit C. 256 Pa. 567; 570. The burden is on
the plaintiff to show that "the negligence of the defendant was
the sole producing and proximate cause" of the injury; Glancy
v. Borough, 243 Pa. 216; 219.
Page 554. Negligence maybe the proximate cause of an injury of which it is not the sole or the immediate cause.
Plymouth Township v. Graver, 125 Pa. 24; Burrell Township v.
Uncapher, 117 Pa. 353.
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ity of no philosopher, is necessary to support so obvious
a principle. The law recognizes duality of causes, in its
doctrine of contributory negligence. There are two negligences, that of the defendant, and that of the plaintiff,
and they co-operate in the production of the one effect,
the injury. The law speaks of proximate and remote
causes, of causes, the results of which are foreseeable
Liaand of causes, whose results cannot be foreseen.
bility for a damage does not depend, then, on the doing
of some thing which can be said to be the sole cause of
that damage.
CO-OPERATING NEGLIGENCES
Two independent agents may do negligent aots, the
confluence of whose effects, eventuates in injury to a
third person. Either might be sued for the result. A
trolley car is about to cross a railroad track. The watchman invites the rmotorman to cross by raising the safety
gates. The car conductor running ahead of the car, also
invites the motorman to advance. He does so, and is injured by an oncoming train. If -hewas influenced by both
signals, or only by that of the watohman, both signalshaving been negligently given, he can recover from the
railroad company.' If the negligence of a master concurs
with that of a fellow-worldmnan, in causing injury to A, he
can recover from the master for the master's negligence
though not for the fellow-servant's
NEGLIGENCE PER SE
Occasionally in certain defined circumstances, certain omissions or acts of certain persons, are legislatively declared to be negligent per se. The XI article of
'Siever v. Railway Co., 252 Pa. 1.
'Kaiser v. Flaccus, 106 Pa. 332; Weinschenk v. Bread Co.,
258 Pa. 98.

"P. L. 177.
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the Act of June 2d, 1891,' concerning anthracite rining,
requires the owner, etc. of mines, on the request of miners for propi, ties, etc. to furnish them at or near the
m iner's working .place, and declares that the failure to
do so shall be an offense, and taken to be negligence
per se, on the part of the owner,, etc., in action for the
recovery of damages for accidents resulting from insufficient propping of the mine, through failure to furnish
the required props. From this it follows that when an
accident happens from- the fall of coal, after unheeded
notice to furnish props, the mere falling with injury to
the miner, will warrant the inference that it was the
result of the owner's negligence."
The Act of April
29th, 1909, P. L. 2 8 3 b forbids the employment of boys
under 16 years of age, unless the employer procures and
keeps on file, an employment certificate, and two lists
of minors under 16 years, one to be kept in the employer's office and one to be conspicuously posted.
These
lists not being kept and posted, if a minor under 16
is injured-, while employed, the employer will be liable
for the injury. The employment is the proximate cause
of it." The 11th sect. of the Act of May 2d, 1905
P. L. 355, provides that "Exhaust fans of sufficient
power or other sufficient devises, shall be provided for
the purpose of carrying off poisonous fumes and gases
and dust from enery wheels, grind-stones and other machinery creating dust."
The empiloyer is liable to the
worknmen, who is injured by poisonous fumes, without
negligence of himself, the requirements of this statute
not having been obeyed by the employer.' Although
the law forbids for automobiles a greater speed than 24
miles per hour, transgressing that limit will not make
"°Kolalsky v. Del. and H. Co. 260 Pa. 357; Sudnick v. Coal
Co., 257 Pa. 226; C. F. Kruflies v. Coal Co 2.49 Pa. 162.
"Chabot v. Glass Co. 259 Pa. 504. Apparently, contributory
negligence is not imputable.
'Fritz v. Tanning Co. 258 Pa. 180.
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the .miverliable for injury from a collision, unless the
excessive speed was the cause of the accident. The violation of the statute must be the "efficient cause of the
injury.''
COURT-MADE DEFINITIONS OF NEGLIGENCE
It is negligence, per se, to cross a railroad track
without stopping, and looking and listening for approaching trains.' It is not negligence per se for the driver
of a team ascending a hill, with a heavy load, to descend
from the wagon, walk behind, and from that place direct
the movement of the horse, even though there is an unguarded declivity along the roa, down which the vehicle
slips and falls.' A high rate of speed of a trolley car,
is not per se negligent." A master who uses in his business maohinery whdch is ordinarily used in such business is not negligent in so using it. Nor will the use of
machinery different from that ordinarily used, ipso facto
be negligent. It may be safer than the ordinary or
equally safe, or less safe. Leaving a horse unhitched
and unattended upon a city street is presumptively negligent."
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF OTHER THAN
PLAINTIFF
An injury may result from the combined action of
the negligence of the defendant and another. Ordinarily, if the obher is not the plaintiff, the fact that -his
"Stuhbbs v. Edwards 260 Pa. 75.
"Nagle v. R. R. 88 Pa. 35; Cohen v. R. R. Co. 211 Pa. 227.
But after getting on the tracks whether it is negligent or not.
not to stop, look and listen, depends on circumstances, and is
for the jury.
'WWinegardner v. Springfield Township, 258 Pa. 496.
"'Jerdon v. Rapid T. Co. 260 Pa. 275.
'1Fullick v. Oi lCo. 260 Pa. 4.
'lenry v. Klopfer, 147 Pa. 1'78; Stevenson v. Express Co.,
221 Pa. 59.
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regligence has co-operated in effecting the untoward result, does not exonerate the defendant wholly or even
partially. He is iable to the whole efntent of the damage. But, there are cases in which A claims compensation for the hurt of B. A widow" or child may demand it for the death of her husband, or its father. A
father0 or mother' may demand it for an injury to a
minor child. In such cases, if the negligence of the deceased has made effective that of the defendant: i. e.,
if the deceased negligently contributed to the injury,
there can be no recovery. If the parent has negligently
allowed the irresponsible child to incur the risk which
has eventuated in his injury, while the parent cannot
recover from the defendant, the irresponsible child may.'
A's horse and wagon is being driven by his son, who negligently crosses a railroad. The horse and wagon are
injured by a train. The negligence of the son, who apparently is treated as agent of his father, prevents the
son's recovery for injury to himself, and the father's
recovery, for injury to the horse and wagon.'
THE LAST CLEAR CHANCE
dewill
negligence
Not every contributory
feat a claim for compensation for injury caused
A may negligently place himself
by the defendant.
where he will be in imminent danger, if a certain machine is set in motion. If B, aware of A's situation, and
of the risk arising from it ,and the operation of the machine, starts it, he will be liable for the consequence."
The doctrine that, although the plaintiff's negligence ex"Miller v. W. Jersey R. R. Co., 257 Pa. 517; Reigner v. Pa.
R. R. 258 Pa. 257; Cazzulo v. Colseher, 261 Pa. 447.
"Faulk v. Duquesne Light Co., 259 Pa. 389.
'Corbin v. Philada 195 Pa. 461.
"IKuehne v. Brown, 257 Pa. 37. Injury of child by automobile.
'4Borofsky v. R. R. Co., 65 Super. 389.
2"Walsh v. Railway Co., 221 Pa. 463.
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poses him to the risk of injury, if the injury is more immediately caused by the defendant's omission, after becoming aware of the risk, to use ordinary care for the
purpose of avoiding it, the defendant is liable, seems
to be approved.' If a wagon is advancing on a trolley
track, in front of the trolley, and does not get off when
it shoiud, the motornman must take steps to avoid collidL
' Yet it is said that "no one has a right careing with it.
lessly; (and purposely) to put himself in a position of
danger, relying entirely on the assumption that another,
who controls the sources of such danger will see to his
protection.
ANTICIPATING OTHERS' NEGLIGENCE
Negligence is not so common that one man is bound
to expect it in another and adopt neans to avert its consequence. Many illustrations may be found of this principle. The driver of an automobile, seeing a truck on a
cross street approaching the crossing, has a right to assume that the truck will not come to the crossing at immoderate speed, and not under control so as to nake a
collision likely. No man is bound to anticipate the negliA motor-cyclist may assume that
gence of another."
the operator of an approaching autonwbbile will exercise
care to avoid a collision." A man, standing near a wagon
loaded with lumber, as his duty required, was injured by
the unexpected discharge of the Iumber. "A man," said
Justice Walling, "is not required to so guard hinself that
1 t, cannot be injured by the unexpected negligence of
It is not contributory negligence in a pasanother."'
"More
'Hess v. Kemmerer, 65 Super. 247.
seems to have no meaning.
'Doyle v. Rapid T. Co., 261 Pa. 248. Dictum.
'Young v. Rapid T. Co., 248 Pa. 174.
OBew v. Dailey, 260 Pa. 416.
"3ell v. Jacobs, 261 Pa. 204.

"Clark v. Lloyd Co., 254 Pa. 168.

immediately"
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senger on a train, in alighting, to rely on the aid of a
brakeman, and not to foresee that he will suddenly let
go his 'hand, causing his fall.' One about to cross a street,
seeing a trolley coming, is not ordinarily bound to stop
till it passes.
He may assume that the car will approach the crossing with due care, with respect to speed.2
A. motorman has a right to assume that one driving a
wagon along side of the track, in front of his car, will
not drive on the track.' Wagon crosses the track of a
trolley, at a street crossing. The driver is not bound to
suspect that the car will approach the crossing at an excessive speed, and the Tdotorman is not bound to anticipate that the driver will turn suddenly upon the tnaclk, in
front of the car, without warning.'
ORDINANCES
In several cases where negligence is imiputed to the
defendant, -ordinances of the city in which the alleged
negligent act was done are put
in
evidence.
Thus
ordinances fixing the rate at whicl trains might run,
in Lancaster, in Harrisburg, requiring vehicles to keep
to the right, in Reading', in Philadelphia. The ordinance
is admitted not to show that by the infraction of it, ipso
facto, a liability has been incurred, but as some evidence that the act by which it was infringed, was a negligent one. "It may" said the trial judge,' "be taken into consideration by the jury, with other evidence in ascertaining Whether or not the cars on July 3d, 1891 (the
'Hager v. Pa. R. R. Co., 261 Pa. 359.
Patterson v. Railways Ci., 260 Pa. 214; Wagner v. Rapid
T. -Co., 252 Pa. 354.
'Doyle v. Rapid T. C*., 261 Pa. 248.
'Moses v. Railway Co., 258 Pa. 537.
'Lederman v. R. R. Co., 165 Pa. 118.
'Pa. R. R. v. Lewis, 79 Pa. 33.
"Bell v. Jacobs, 261 Pa. 204.
'Forte v. Amer. Product Co., 195 Pa. 190.
'Lederman v. Railroad, 165 Pa. 118.
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date of the killing of plaintiff's child) were run at too
high and dangerous a rate df speed -where the accident
occurred.'"" "While," said Walling J. in a case- of collision from the violation by one of the colliding parties
cf the rule as to keeping to the right, "such ordinance is
not per se evidence of negligence (he means sufficient,
of itself to prove negligence) it may be considered in
connection with the (other) evidence in the case."' When
the city whose ordinance is put in evidence. is the defendant, its admissibleness would be less questionable.
A boy being injured by coming in contact with a wire
which had become charged with -electricity from a feed
wire of an electric railway, in the action by him for
damages, an ordinance of Philadelphia, and rules of the
police department, relating to the inspection and use
of the city wires, were put in evidence. This evidence,
mildly says Mitchell, J., "though not important, was not
incompetent. It merely tended to make more clear and
definite the responsibility for due care, vhich existed
outside of them."'" To justify the use of the ordinance,
a breach of it miust be alleged.
The ordinance is conceived to express a standard of care, to which the defendant has failed to conform. An ordinance of Philadelphia provided for insipection of elevators and required
the owner, after its inspection to procure from the inspector a certificate that it is in good condition, and to
expose this certificate to public view. In a suit in which
violation of this ordinance was not the negligence charg1105 Pa. 1.18.

"Bell v. Jacobs, 261 Pa. 204; Foote v. Amer. Product Co.,
195 Pa. 190. Although an ordinance of Philadelphia requires
cars to stop at a certain corner, a motorcyclist may be negligent in assuming that -a car will stop at this corner; di Orio v.
Rapid T C.o., 260 Pa. 399.

'2Herron v. Pitsburg, 204 Pa. 509.

An ordinance of Phil-

adelphia required freight elevators to have their hatch-ways
Surrounded by vertical windows and gates, and all gates to be
self-closing. In suit for injury from an uninclosed elevator,

this ordinance was admissible.

Weinschenk v. Co., 258 Pa. 98.
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ed, the ordinance should not be admitted. It would only
confuse and. mislead the jury. The alleged negligence
was the employing up on the effevator a defective shifting rod for starting and stopping it."
The justification of the reception of ordinances, as
evidence that acts not conforming to themn are negligent, is somewhat difficult to realize. They are said
by Moschzisker, J., to be "introduced simply as an expression of municipal opinion" to aid the jury in its deliberations. But, the men whose opinion they express,
are not experts, are not sworn, are not subject to crossexamination.
AMAN AS A CAUSE
The soul of man sits within the periphery of his
body and by its volitions, sets in action this body, or
its mobile parts. By bodily action alone he may inflict
danages upon his fellow, as when he impeds his closed
hand against the face of the latter. His arm is his implement. He may seize a piece of matter, external to
his body, and wield it as a tool for the doing of hurt to
o hers, as 'when he strikes another with a club, or, a
more complex weapon, with the discharged contents of
a rifle. He may cause damage, not to the bodies of other
hunan beings only, but to their property, their horses.
their utensils, their houses. 'These effects of a man's
activity unwelcome to his neighbbors, may have been imagined, and purposely produced. When a harm or injury to others, or the property of others is preconceived,
willed, and done, there is ordinarily liability. But, in
this article we are not concerned with the causation of
harm or injury in this mode.
Harm can be inflicted by A on B, without intention.
He may be aiming at the doing of a neutral or a praise13Ubelmann v. Amer. Ice Co., 209 Pa. 398.
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worthy thing, and do it so heedlessly, so awkwardly, so
unskillfully, as to produce collateral mischiefs which the
state determines that he should be made to repair. He,
e. g. shoots at a fleeing murderer, does not hit him, by
reason of his unskillfulness or rashness and kills an innocent bystander. He undertakes to convey X in an
automobile to a certain place, and operates the vehicle
so negligently as to cause it to overturn and as to injure
X. He produces results which he did not imagine,
against vhich, had he imagined them, he would have
vehemently relucted. For these untoward results of his
activity he may be held responsible to the persons affected by them.
The case last supposed, is one of intended activity,
where unintended collateral effects are produced. There
are numerous cases in which inaction is regarded as a
wrong to the persons who would have been benefited by
action. A cild needs food. It is said to be the duty
of the parent to furnish food to it. Not to furnish it,
that is, to do nothing, would be a breach of the duty
which the state has imposed. Without food, the child
will die. Rut, the parent is not responsible for that order of sequence. It -has been established by the Demiurgus. His task is to change the antecedent-foodlessness, so as to avert the consequent, viz. starvation.
Not only may nature ordain sequences which must be
arrested; but men may do the same. The formation of a
ri't will result in injury to life or property. It may
be the duty of a city, a county, particular officials, to
prevent the, mob, or to frustrate its violence. Not to
do the required things at all, would expose to liability,
and would often be called negligence, although it was
deliberate and intended. To do them ineffectively and
unwisely, would be negiigence in a stricter sense. Negligence then, may be active, when it is the concomitant of the exercise of energy; and passive when it con.
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sists in inaction, when the circumstances impose a duty
of action.
SPECIMENS OF PASSIVE NEGLIGENCE
A is riding in an automobile operated by B. B's
reckless management will piobably produce disaster.
A must do what could reasonably be done to change the
conduct of B, or, if a collision happens, caused in part by
B's method, A will get no redress from the otcher party
to the collision." A woman, riding in a motorcycle with
a man, wtho was operating it, enters no protest against
his running so recklessly as to threaten a collision with
a street car. She could not recover damages from the
transit conpany, because the operator Was improperly
taking the risk of driving in front of a running car, and
the woman was a "volunteer in this hazardous undertaking and entered no protest against the driver's proceedbig in front of a moving car."' 5 Not restraining a
child, from, crossing a street and exposing it to danger, may be negligence in the father."
PREVENTING OTHERS FROM INJURING THEMSELVES
Sometimes things are done or tolerated by X of which
it is necessary that A should have notice, in order that
ne may avoid injury from them. There may spring a
duty on X to give A information of the risk, or to adopt
other measures to prevent his incurring it. An obstacle
e. g. a fallen tree is in the highway.
It may
be
actionable
negligence
in the
city, not
" lardie v. Barrett, 257 Pa. 42. But sometimes the passenger in an automobile, witnessing the recklessness of the
chauffeur, may nevertheless, prudently abstain from interference. Vocca v. Pa. R. R., 259 Pa. 42. Wanner v. R. R., 261

Pa. 273.
"Volpe v. Rapid T. Co., 260 Pa. 402.
"Kuehne
v. Brown, 257 Pa. 37.
"TRockett v. Philada., 356 Pa. 347.
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to put out lights
or adopt
other
means to
prevent a collision with it." Persons about to cross a
railroad, might be warned of an approaching train by
whistle or bell or watchman the omission to use which
would be negligent."8 Boys will go for a lost ball. It falls
into a pit, maintained by a city, at the bottom of wvhich
is poisonous gas. The city must know the tendency of
boys and prevent, by warnings acting on their minds or
by physical obstacles, their access to the bottom of the
pit. If one without warning enters and is asphyxiated,
his parent nay recover for his death from the city." A
gas pipe in a street is broken. Gas escapes from it into an adjacent sewer. One who properly goes into the
sewer, with a ligiht, and is injured by an explosion of
the gas, may recover from the gas company, for not re,pairing the pipe." Not giving notice to a workman of a
change in the dperation of the machinery that would
increase his risk' not instructing a miner as to danger
from unexpioded shots in the coal' not notifying a man
who is near an engine, and whose hearing may be inj.-red by the noise, unless 'headopts precautions against
iU,of the intentio to blow the whistle' may be negligent. Failing to irotify a workman who heretofore has
been handling washing soda, of the substitution of
caustic soda, and whose injury would have been avoided
had he knoWn, is negligence " as is not disclosing to a
conductor, who is to conduct a train on a track, that
another train will be coming towards him on the same
track.'
"Oento-fante v. R. R., 244 Pa. 255; Kobylis v. R. R., 201
Pa. 350.
"Corbin v. Philada., 195 Pa. 461.
"Oil City Gas Co. v. Robinson, 99 Pa. 1.
"Yeager v. Brewing Co., 259 Pa. 123.
"Jelie v. Jamison, 259 Pa. 447.
"Royer v. Pa. R. R., 259 Pa. 438.
9Solomon v. Packing Co., 256 Pa. 19.
"Kuhn v. Liganier Valley R. R., 261 Pa. 147.
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THE PLAINTIFF'S CARE
In order to recover for injury resulting from the
defendant's negligence, the plaintiff must have been
free from a contributing negligence. His care, however,
is presumed, untiZ sohne evidende furnished either by
hin=elf or the defendant appears, of his negligence. The
case W.hich he makes out may disclose no want of care.
The .burden of proving it would then be on the defendant.' In a case of collision with a train at a crossing
the plaintiff's saying that he stopped and looked, is not
to be interpreted, as an assertion that he did not listen.
That he did not listen, it would be for the defendant to
prove."7 The evidence of the plaintiff may be self-contradictory, one part implicating 'him in negligence, the
other not. One witness for him may testify to facts
which reveal care, and another, to facts which reveal
want of care. In such cases it is not for the court to
decide that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. The jury must determine which of the inconsigtent assertions is true.'
NEGLIGENCE IN NOT CORRECTING NEGLIGENCE
Two persons may be responsible for an injury resuliting from the same state of things, although they
have not jointly produced it. A pavement in front of
A's house in a borough, becones and is negligently allowed by A to remain, icy. After a certain time, it will
beeontme negligence, on the part of the borough, if this
An accident to a
condition is permitted to continue.
pedestrian occurs after this time has elapsed. The injared person may recover from the borough. The borcugh may then recover from A, what it has been obligIt may use
ed to pay, if its payment was justified.
"Martin v. Traction Co., 261 Pa. 96; Ely v. Railway, 158
Pa. 233.

"Waltosh v. R. R. 259 Pa. 372.

"Ely v. Railway, 168 Pa. 233; Martin v. Traction Co., 261

Pa. 96.
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the judgment against it, as the proof and the measure
of A's liability, if A had received notice of the action
against the borough, and of the opportunity to intervene therein, to make the defense.'
NATURAL CONSEQUENCE
There are no absolute beginnings. Every state or act
of every thing is preceded by an endlessly regressing
chain of states and acts. Each of tihese in turn is the
forerunner of another endless chain developing in thu
future. In holding a man responsible for the effects of
his act, it was felt to be preposterous to charge him
with effects developing years after his act, and at widely
separated points in space. Some criteria were sought, to
distinguish the consequences for which a man should be
made responsible, from those for which he should not
be so made. One of the notes of a consequence for which
a causer should be liable, is that it be the "natural"
We may disconsequence." But, what is natural?
tinguish between the effects of human volition and
other effects and agree to call the latter natural, while
those others are artificial. There is no other intelligible distinction. But, is it true that a n=an is not liable for the consequences of his act which are mediated
by the acts of other human beings? No! For results
of the acts of other persons, which acts are induced by
X, or, being preventible by him, are not prevented, X
has in hundreds of cases been held responsible. A man
can incur the responsibility of a murderer through the
action of another. He is guilty of the negligent causation of another, in nmany cases, in which he fails by giv-'Hollidaysburg v. Snyder, 258 Pa. 206.

'TPa. R. R. v. Hope, 80 Pa. 376. Cf. cases where sellers of
held to be responsible, as
persons are
liquor to intoxicated
causes, for the acts of the drunken man which are injurious to
himself or others. Bier v. Myers, 81 Super. 1,58 is a speciman.

16

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

ing warnings of danger, to dissuade other persons
from action; e. g. the man about to cross a track, who
is not dissuaded by a blast of the w~histle, or the ringing of the bell; or the boy who wilL, unless warned descend into a pit where lurks a noxious gas, and be asphyxiated.' An improper signal caused a train to be
wrecked and cars to be thrown on an adjacent track.
With these wrecked cars, another train collided. The
jury was allowed to find that the giving of the signal
was the responsible cause of the death of X in the collision.2 In short, the word natural, in any appreciable
sense, does not distinguish the events for which a causer is liable, from bhe other events. The definition ot
Orlady J.,' "the natural consequence of an act is the
consequence which ordinarily flows from it," is not
usual. No act is usually followed by a particular conquence, unless its concomitants, the co-operating or conditioning causes are usually the same.
Usual would
be a much better word than natural to describe the consequences, were this tihe thought intended to be expressed.
PROBABLE EFFECT
The word probable is usually linked with the word
natural, in describing the effects for which an agent is
liable. "The injury" says Agnew J., "must be the nat'Corbin v. Philada., 195 Pa. 461. A may do an act without
concert with B, and B an act without concert with A. The union of the effects of their acts may cause damage to X. Both
A and B may be jointly liable. Yet the damage is produced by
A's act only through the mediation of B's, and vice versa; 0'
Malley v. Rapid T. Co., 248 Pa. 292.
'Thomas v. Central R. R.. 194 Pa. 511. A township which
has neglected to put guard rails where they should be, is responsible for the result, a horse being frightened, although it is
frightened by the negligent act of another. Burrell Township v.
Uncapher, 117 Pa. 353.
'Swanson v. Crandell, 2 Super. 85.
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ural and probable consequence of the negligence,"' and
he adds, "such a consequence as under the surrounding
circumstances of the case might and ought to have
been foreseen by the wrongdoer as likely to flow
from his act."' When the event has been accomplished,
what was its cause is a question of history. When the
cause has just happened, what is going to be its consequence is a question of prophecy. The rule is intended to be one to regulate conduct, and conduct will
be regulated only by the state of nind of the doer at
the time of the act. By probable consequence must be
meant then, a consequence not yet happened, bat whose
sequence may be thought about and expected. It is
idle however to affirm that the particular consequence
in a vast maority of cases, of the particular act of X
may or should be anticipated. It would be hazardous to
affirm that any consequence of the class to which it belongs should be susceptible of anticipation, in order to
make the doer responsible. When event (a) has happened, event (x) is or is not going to follow from it.
There is no midway position. There are no degrees of
actuality of the causal bond. Probability is not in the
events external to the mind but in the mind. There are
degrees of belief and doubt as to certain facts, and the
facts are styled improbable or probable or certain with
respect to these subjective states.
Probable is distinguished from possible by Green J.,
"Things" he says' "which are possible may never happen, but those which are natural or probable, (those
-words are used apparently as synonyms) are those
which do happen and happen with such frequency or
regularity as to become a matter of definite inference.
To impose such a standard of care as requires, in the
"Pa. R. R. v. Hope, 8" Pa. 370.
'Railway Co. v. Frich, 117 Pa. 390; Hoag v. R R.., 85 Pa.
293; Swanson v. Crandell, 2 Super. 85.
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ordinary affairs of life precaution on the part of individuals against all the possibilities which may occur,
is establishing a degree of responsibility quite beyond
any legal limitations which have yet been declared."
The thing in question, viz, the faling from a car of a
woman Who was entering it, With one foot on the step,
because of the sudden starting of the car: and who,
thrust back on the street, was run over by a run-away
horse, was possible, and actual. Before it happened it
was not likely. The court thought that it was not natural or probable, and could not have been anticipated
as a probable consequence of the starting of the car.
Perhaps we may say, in order to limit the area of responsibility, that the doer of an act may be made liable for any consequences which are more or less in
type, like consequences which the doer, if a man of ordinary imagination, with time to indulge it, would at
the time of doing the act be likely to anticipate as
likely to follow. The vagueness and arbitrariness of
such a limitation are painfully evident in the decisions.'

PR6XIMATE
Another epithet by which the results of an act for
which the doer is responsible, are distinguished is the
word Droxinfate. But, to. be proximate, the effect need
not be realized in space, near the point at which the
cause operates. A spark may cause a fire at (a). The
fire spreads to (b), and (c), and (d), until it reaches
buildings, etc., at (e) 600 feet from (a). The result at
(e) is nevertheless proximate The capacity of the fire
to spread so far, depended on the accidental presence
Railway v. Trieh, 117 Pa. 390.
"Agnew, C. J., says that if consequences must be deemed
too remote when the result is "not within the probable foresight
of the party whose neeligence is alllged to have produced it."
Pa. R. R. v. Hope, 80 Pa. 373.
'Pa. R. R. v. Hope, 80 Pa. 373.
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along its course of combustible materials of various
kinds- of dry grass, of fences, etc. As remoteness in
space of the effect from the cause is not decisive that
the effect is too remote for liability for it, so remoteness in time need not be decisive. The negligent act
ieed not be "the nearest cause in the order of time.'
A limit to the length of the interval between the cause
and the alleged effect, cannot be defined.
Courts and
juries will decide whether the permissible distance has
been transcended in each case. The vanity of attempts
to generalize a definition of proximateness, cannot
be better illustrated than in the psendo scientific effort
of the court in Wallace v. Keystone Auto Co."
It is
there said that the proximate cause of an actionable
accident is (a) "the dominant and efficient cause." But
what kind of a cause is an inefficient one?
Does it
cause, or does it not? And what is a "dominant"
cause.
Every cause dominates (if the word is liked)
its effect, by dragging it from non-existence to existence. The function of the word seems to be rhetorical
rather than logical. But, (b) it is said the cause "acts
directly or necessarily sets in motion other causes, not
created by an independent agency, -and which naturally
and reasonahly results in injury," whidh under the circumstances ought to have been anticipated in the nature of things by a man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence, although in advance it might have seemed improbable, and the precise form in which the injury actually resulted could not have been foreseen."
This
seems to say that the responsible act may be immediate'Plymouth Tcwnship v. Graver, 125 Pa. 24; Burrell Township v. Uncapher, 117 Pa. 353; Eagle Hose Co. v. Electric
Iight Co., 33 Super. 581. In Wallace v. Auto Co., 239 Pa. 110,
it is said that time or distance between the primary cause and
the effect is not important, except as making the effect improbable. What is important is the unity of the series of events for
the initial cause to the ultinate effect.
1°0M9

Pa- 110.
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ly followed by the injury, or that it may cause act or
state (lb); (1b) may cause act or state (c); (c) may
cause act or state (d), and (d) may cause the injury.
But b,c4 must not be caused by an independent agency.'
But, does this mean that if they are caused by the conturrence of the "dominant and efficient cause," and
other causes there is no responsibility for that cause?
The universe is a plexus of forces, anastomosing -with
each other. A separate chain each link in which is
single and discrete is a mere figment of the unschooled imagination.
The negligent cause for which one may be responsible must "naturally and reasonably result in injury."
if it results it naturally results, unless it is meant to
say that the result must not be due to the supervention on the negligent act of the volitional act of divine,
angelic, satanic, or human beings, annexing to the act
consequences wihich would not have happened otherwise.
But to say that a man is not accountable for a negligent act that would not have produced the injury, if
some other voluntary agent had not also acted, is to
ignore multitudes of adjudications. Preoisely what is
meant by "reasonably" resulting in injury, only a process of divination can discover. The man who suffers
the harrm is apt to think that it has happiened unreasonably.
The injury ought to have been anticipated in the nature of things by a man of ordinary intligence. "In
the nature of things," a phrase so often fondly used
The injury
by indistinct thinkers means nothing.
should be anticipated, even if it seemed improbable.
Though improbable, it was still possible or it would not
have happened. A man must then have imagination
enough to anticipate (to expect? to think likely? to
think possible, though unlikely?) the mimdhief, even
though the injury that has happened "could not have
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been foreseen." But, if the thing Which has happened,
could not have been foreseen what it it which should
have been anticipated? Is it something like the thing?
How like? If a broken leg could have been anticipated,
is there responsibility for a broken neck? If a bruise
could have been imagined, will the anticipation make
Of a wide class of injuries some
liable for a death?
one must have been susceptible of anticipation; then
there will be liability for any other of this wide class,
though it was not and, by the defendant could not have
been, anticipated.
What has been said suggests that the possession
of a criterion for determining for what negligences
there shall be responsibility, is still a desideratum.
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MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH vs. HUDSON
Cohen for plaintiff.
Davis for defendant.
STAT EENT OF FACTS
Hudson is on trial for murder vf X. The State calls a witness to prove that 4 days after the shooting, X, expressing the
conviction that he could not live, declared that he was shot by
X continued alive for seven
Hudson without provocation.
clays after the making of the declaration. The court admitted
the evidence. Hudson is convicted.

OPINION OF COURT
FLA4GEIJlAN, J. It seems to this court that the question
to be considered in this case is whether or not the statement
made by X is a dying declaration and should be admitted as
such.
The defendant contends that it is a mere supposition that
X was in fear of death and since the actual fear was not proven that the statement of X should not be admitted.
This court takes the view that the actual fear of impending death need not be proven. The facts show clearly that X
was in a hospital. He had been shot. The two facts coupled
-with the fact that he was.very weak were sufficient to put that
fear into his heart. The psychological effect of hospital surroundings made that impression even stronger.
The defendant argues that seven days elapsed between the
making of the declaration and the exodus of X. But that make
no difference. Greenleaf on Evidence (page 228) says that all
that is necessary is fear of impending death. Furthermore in Kehoe vs. Commonwealth 85 Pa. 127 it was held that a dying declaration is always admissable when it is made under a sense of
impending death and the time of death is irrelevant.
It is a -well established fact that when a man senses impending death a fear of God is planted in his heart and the
fear of leaving this earth with sin upon his soul opens
up his heart in confession and it is an assumption that under
these circumstances, he will tell the truth and the whole truth.
For every man wants to face his Maker clean.
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It appears that thd case at hand fits all these facts. At
the time X made the statement he thought he was going to die
and he did die within a week. Under those circumstances this
court holds that it was a proper dying declaration and as such
vas properly admitted in evidence.
OPINION OF SUMEM.E COURT
Declarations of facts, made out of court, out of the presence of persons to be affected by them, and not subject to cross
examination, are generally inadmissible.
Statements are sometimes admitted, because accompanying
relevant facts, and so intimately related as to be (as the phrase
is) parts of the res gestae. The res gestae here, are the homicide. X's statement was made 4 days thereafter, and at a different place, and under different circumstances. It could not
be admitted as a part of the res gestae.
A recognized exception to the principle that unsworn statements are inadmissible, is that of dying declarations. The declaration of one since dead, in a trial for his killing, is receivable
under certain limitations. This is a trial for the murder of X,
and X is the person whose declaration is offered.
The declaration concerns the killing. It alleges that X (a)
was shot; (b) was shot by Hudson; and (c) was thus shot without provocation. These are the proper subject-matters of such
a statement. Commonwealth v. Latampa, 226 Pa. 23; 2 Criminal Law, 277.
The declaration must be a "dying" declaration. This does
not mean that it must be made in articulo mortis; that the process of dying must be, far advanced, so that its consummation in
death follows almost immediately. Here X continued alive, 7
days after making his assertion. That circumstance does not
negative the "dying" character of the statement. See Commonwealth v. Birriolo, 197 Pa. 371, where life continued six days
thereafter; 11 days thereafter; and Panna v. Stoops. Add. 381;
16 days thereafter.
The declarant must believe that his injuries are going to
kill him in a short time. This belief is important as furnishing
some guaranty that the declarant is endeavorng to tell the truth.
The existence of this belief must be proved. The nature of the
injury may at times, satisfy us that the injured party being
aware of it, knew its mortal character. But, he may express
his belief. 2 Grim. Law 973; Codmonwealth v. Latampa, 226 Pa.
23. In this case X exprsesed the conviction that he could not
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live. This justified the reception of his declaration as made by
one who was expecting soon to die of the injuries he had received.
There was no error in the trial, of which the defendant may
properly complain.
Affirmed

ESTATE OF THOMPSON
STATEM]NT OF FACTS
Thompson devised all his estate, $100,000, to a cpllege for
the increase of its endowment_ His will was subscribed by two
witnesses, both disinterested, qnd at the time, competent. Before
the probate of the will, one of them, X, was cotvicted of perjury and was not allowed to testify. In a contest between the
executor and the college, the latter claimed the estate, despite
the act of April 26, 1855, 1 Stewart's Purdon, 595.
For plaintiff, H. J. Flannery.
For defendant. Win. Jones.
OPINION OF COURT
DOM-BRO, J. The question arises on the vagueness of the
following act: "INo estate, real or personal, shall hereafter be
bequeathed, devised or conveyed to any body poltiic; or to any
person, in trust for religious or charitable uses, except the same
be done by deed or will, attested by two credible, and, at the
time, disinterested witnesses, at least one calandar month before
the decease of the testator or alienor; and all dispositions of
property contrary hereto, shall be void and go to the residuary
legatee or devisee, next of heir or kin, according to law."
Must the witnesses be credible and competent at the time
of the execution of the will or when offered for probate or
both?
Interpreting the act, it would seem that the legislative
intention was that the witnesses must be credible, not only at
It seems
their attestation but also when the will is probated.
that a slight distinction was made between the time that they
must be credible and when they must be disinterested for it expressly requires that the witness be disinterested at the time of
his credibility.
Be that as it may, we can see no difficulty in decreeing that
the credibility of X at the time of the probate is not necessary.
the execution of the will and makes no such restriction as to
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X's testimony is not necessary to make the will valid and legal.
His attestation while he was credible and competent, is all that
the act requires.
'The act expressly states that the will must be attested by
two credible and at the time, disinterested witnesses.
The devise of Thompson was attested by two credible and at
the time, disinterested witnesses.
"The competency of the attesting witnesses is to be tested as of the date of the execution of the will and any incompetency arising subsequently does not render the attestation unvalid." Historical Sov. v. Kelker 2,26 Pa. 16.
There is no allegation on the part of the executor concerning the signature of the now incredible X. His signature can
be proved by those familiar with his hand writing but this proof
is not necessary as the executor does not contest this point.
Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Thompson's devise of his estate, worth $100,000, was to a
college, and therefore, it is alleged, to a religious or charitable
use. The modern college iis not so related to religion, that a
devise to it could be termed a devise to a religious use.
A devise to a college, however, may be to a "charitable
use." A college, incorporated for the purpose of making profit for the incorporators, would not be a charity. Money can be
made in various useful businesses, in baking bread, in making
clothes, in imparting information, skill, etc. Food for the body
is as necessary as food for the mind, and it is no more charitable to engage in the purveyjng of the latter, than of the former, if the purpose is to make money for the purveyor.
The ordinary college, however, does not exist in order to
earn money for its trustees or share-holders. We may then,
-well assume that the devise by Thompson to a college, was a device to a charity. Northampton Co. v. Lafayette College, 1N
Pa. 132. The fact that the instructors in such an institution do
not render their labor gratuitously but usually insist on obtain
ing the highest compensation attainable has no significance
when the question is as to the charitable nature of the college
itself.
Thompson's gift then was for a charitable use. The act of
1855 requires that the will containing it should be attested "by
two credible and at the same time disinterested witnesses." Attestation occurs at the publication of the will, and it is at that
time that the attesting witnesses must be credible and disin-
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terested. No allegation is made that either of the witnesses
was, or since is, interested.
The question is whether the witness must be credible born
when he attests, and when the will is presented for probate. By
"credible" is meant "competent."
Whatever witness the law
will allow to satisfy, it by that fact, proclaims to be credible.
One of these witnesses, has since the execution of the will
been convicted of perjury. The 5th sect. of the act of 1887; P.
L. 159, declares that a person who has been convicted of perjiry "shall not be a competent witness for any purpose." This
attesting witness theh, is no longer credible.
Does the loss
since attestation of the will, o his credibility, make it Ineffectual ?
It would be unaccountable, that the view that it would,
should be adopted.
The loss by an attesting witness of one Of his necessary attributes, viz: disinterestness, afteT
the
attestation does not
render the bequest to a charity in the will inoperative. Historical -Society, etc., v. Kelker, 226 Pa. 16. Why then should the ross
of the other attribute, viz, credibility?
The death of the attesting witnesses renders their testimony
at the probate impossible. Who would imagine that it made the
will null? Proof of the signatures of the witnesses might also
be impossible, yet surely, the will would not be avoided. Proof of
those who recognize the handwriting of the testator would be
available.
No importance can be attached to the phraseology of the
act of 1855, insofar as it says "two credible, and at the time disinterested witnesses." "At the timeP must be understood to
qualify both "credible" and "disinterested."
Affirmed
THOMPSON v. HAWK
Statement of Facts
Hawk drew a cheek on the bank with which he made deposits, payable to Thompson, for $1500. This check was never
presented to the bank, and never paid. Five years And eleven
months after its date, Thompson brings suit against Hawk. The
court said to the jury that, after such delay, there could be no
recovery, unless Thompson proved that no loss had been caused
to Hawk by the delay.
Moskovitz for plaintiff.
Roomberg for defendant.
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COURT

S. C. WEAVER, J. A check is a written order or request,
addressed to a bank or persons carrying on the business of
banking, by a party having money in their hands, desiring them
to pay, on presentment, to a person therein named or bearer,
or to such person or order, a named sum of money. A check is
never due until presented and should be good at all times and
under every circumstance. It would be very foolish and unfair
to say that simply because a man does not present a check for
payment immediately after receiving same---that he can never
collect on it. Hawk's check was simply an instrument through
which Thompson was to obtain from Hawk's bank the sum of
$1500. The act of May 16, 1901 Public Laws, page 194, known
as the Negotiable Instruments Act, provides in section 186, a
check must be presented for payment within a reasonable time
after its issue, or 'the drawer will be discharged from liability
thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay. The fair
inference to be drawn from this language is that if the drawar
has suffered no loss by the delay, he will not be discharged, and
the only way in which the drawer of a check would be liable to
be injured by a failure to present it within reasonable time is
-where subsequent to its delivery andprior to its presentment the
bank upon which it is drawn becomes insolvent. In such a case
as I have quoted-in respect to the check, the drawer will only
be discharged to the extent of the loss he has sustained thereby.
In Flemming v. Denny, 2 Phila. 111. Judge Sharswood said,
page 112. "To an action by a holder against the drawer of a
check, it is no answer
that the check was
not presented in
ieasonable time, unless during the delay the fund has been lost
by failure of the banker. Bradley v. Andrus, 107 Fed., page 196,
also confirms the statement. In the present case there has been
no loss of funds, whatever.
It was not incumbent upon the
plaintiff to show that Hawk suffered no loss.
This is ably
sustained in Spink and Keyes Drug Co. v. Ryan Drug Go., 72
Minnesota, 178, where Judge Mitchell said, It strikes us that
loss by reason of negligent delay, either in making presentnient or in giving notice of dishonor, is a matter of defence to
be pleaded and proved by the drawer, instead of requiring the
bolder to allege and prove a negative as to a matter peculiarily
within the knowledge of the drawer. Rosenbaum v. Hazard, 233
Pa. 206, also confirms this decision. Therefore in the absence
or any allegation or averment of loss by the defendant Hawk.
we think the court below erred, in holding that the burden of
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proof was upon the holder of the instrument to show that the
drawer had suffered no loss. Therefore we reverse the learned
court below and order that judgment for the defendant shall be
given for the full amount of the check.
OPINION OF SUPORIOR COURT
Hawk owed $1500 to Thompson. Not paying it from" his
purse or his strong box, he gave an order to his banker to pay
it to Thompson. He presumably had a sufficient deposit in the
bank to justify the request. To give a check, on a bank where
there are no funds to meet it, is sometimes a crime. Not only
does the drawer emphatically assert when he gives a check
that he has at the time a right to expect the bank to pay it; but
he impliedly promises that he will not chiange the duty of the
bank towards the check-holder, by withdrawing his deposit.
In this case the check has not been presented to the bank,
and hence has not been paid. The deposit against which it was
drawn has, we must presume, continued in the bank, in order
that it might be paid to the holder of the check on presentment.
If the bank has become insolvent, and thus the drawer has
lost his deposit, while allowing it to await the presentment of
the check, the holder of the check must bear the loss. By accepting it, he tacitly agreed to use diligence in presenting it, or,
rather, not to occasion loss to the drawer by a delay in pre.
senting it, and by a supervening insolvency of the bank. If the
bank has failed and Hawk's deposit has been lost to him, It
would be unfair to allow Thompson to recover the amount of
the check from him.
If the bank is still solvent, the money is still there, and if
Hawk pays the $1500 otherwise than through the check, he extinguishes the check, and he suffers no loss.
The question here is, must Hawk show that he has lost all
or some of his deposit, through the bank becoming Insolvent,
while the check was in Thompson's possession, or will this loss
be presumed, till Thompson rebuts it?
The cases are not harmonious. Randolph, in -Commercial
aper, Vol. IV, 1st edition, says, p. 94, "Injury will be presumed
from the delay (in presenting the check) and must be disproved
by the holder. But, although damages to the drawer are presumed from delay in making presentment, the presumption will
be rebutted, if the drawer had no funds in the bank." He cites
authorities sustaining this view, and also some to the contrary.
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Rosenbaum v. Hayard, 233 Pa. 206, cited by the learned
court below holds that the drawer of the check has the burden of
showing that his deposit is irrecoverable. To that we must bow.
But, as to the interest? The presumption is that Hawk
allowed his deposit to remain in bank in order to await the presentment o fthe check. He then did not have the uses of it.
That Thompson, likewise, did not have the use of it is apparently the result of his choice. No interest then, can be allowed
on the $1500 for any time prior to the bringing of the suit. No
.earlier time is indicated by the evidence, as the time when
Thompson communicated his will to Hawk, not to make use of
his check.
The judgment of the learned court below is well supported
by its opinion.
Affrmed
(IOIM&NWEALTH v. JUDSON
Judson was an employer of labor, having 20 women in his
works. These he paid $7.00 per week wages. A Statute of the
State forbade any employment of women at less than $9.00 per
week, and made a violation of its prohibition a misdemeanor,
punishable with a fine of $200.00. Judson disputes the constitutionality of the Statute.
Rockwell, for Plaintiff.
Dorio, for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
KATZ, J.7 It seems to me that there ,gre two questions involved in this case. First, Is the right claimed at bar a vested
right? Secondly, What is a public business and is the business
within the meaning of this case a public business?
In the case at bar the right to my mind is a "vested right."
A right is vested when the right to enjoy, either present or future has become the property of some person or individual as a
present interest. One of the most sacred rights is that of the
individual ability to contract.
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It expressly states in the Constitution of the United States,
that no State shall impair the obligation of contract.
In this
case the right to enjoy such a privilege is taken away.
In the case cited by the counsel for the defense, Munn v.
Illinois, the court said that if the business is one of a public
nature and which affects the public to such a great extent as
to be important, the State could fix a minimum or maximum rate.
but in this case the business is not one of a public nature; at
least it is not said to be one, by The facts of the case, and since
it is not one of such character, State regulation of wages would
be unconstitutional.
There are cases in Pennsylvania where the wages of school
teachers are fixed by Statute, but that is of a public nature and
can be regulated.
It has been argued by the counsel for the defense that since
a State may regulate the hours of labor of female workers engaged in industry, the implied right is inherent with the State
to regulate the wages for such labor.
However the
regulation of hours of labor and the regulation of wages
for such labor differ. The State undoubtedly has the right to
regulate the hours of female workers since the effect of overwork by long hours can easily be seen. In such a case the effect on the community would indeed be harmful since maternal
obligations would be impaired in many respects.
In the case of wages as I said before, there would be no
such far reaching, disrupting effect upon the community as a
whole and therefore the State could zrot regulate it under the
police powers.
However, the same argument may be set forth in arguing
for the defense, provided the wage is so low as to be detrimental.
It seems to me that the State could fix a "reasonable" minimum
wage. 'However the question of what is a reasonable wage is a
difficult one. I am therefore led to believe that under the conditions which are mentioned in this case and the arguments advanced by the counsel for the plaintiff, that the law is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.
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I can see nothing relevant in the case of Munn vs. Illinois
as cited by the counsel for defense.
Judgment for plaintiff.
DPINION OF STJRF)ME COURT
The state is interfering- more and more with the volitions of
its citizens. Of late years, legislation has limited the time during
which women could make themselves useful by performing wageearning, and therefore life-sustaining labor, and in a number of
cases, this legislation has been held by the Supreme Court of
the U. S., not to infringe the principle that no state shall deprive a person of liberty or property, without due process of law.
To enact that, one shall not labor in a day, more than 8 or 10,
or 12 hours, is plainly to deprive one of liberty. But is it to
deprive him unduly? A law forbidding women working more
than 10) hours in laundrieg, Muller v. Oregon 208 U. S. 412; or
more than 10 hours in any manufacturing or mechanical establishment; Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U. S. 671, or more than 8
hours in a hotel; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373; or more than
8 hours as a pharmacistin a hospital, 23@ U. S. 385, has been
deemed constitutional by our highest court.
But, if states lessen the time during which people can perform paid labor, they lessen their earnings, their food, clothing,
etc., unless at the same time, they supply from some source, the
wages that could have beer earned during the hours in excess of
the prescribed maximum. This supplementary money might come
from a fund raised by general taxation. But, to tax generally,
for the benefit of the women whose earnings were reduced by the
People
restriction of the hours of work would be unpopular.
are charitably desposed towards others, if the satisfaction of their
zentiment ean be accomplished at the expense of others.
Then, the plan becomes enticing, of becoming kind towards
the workers, by compelling the employer so to increase the compensation of his employes, that they will get for 8 hours' work,
what heretofore they have been getting only for 10 hours' work.
From lessening the number of hours, of labor, the step to increasing the wages per hour, at the cost of the employer, is short
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and easy. The Supreme Court of Arkansas State v. Crowe, 130
Ark. 272; 197 S. W. 4, has sustained a law which prescribed a
minimum rate of wages for women. Inadequate wages tend to
impair the health and morals of women. With too small wages,
they cannot get adequate food, clothing, shelter. The maintenance
of their virtue, and vigor, is of vast importance to the state.
Hence, the state's power to penalize the act of paying them less
than a reasonable prescribed wage.
If this wage is so high that women's labor is unprofitable,
the employer will dispense with their services, and either employ
men or cease to maintain the business. Perhaps the next step of
the kind-hearted state, will be to compel A or B, or C, to carry
on the business, whether he wants to, or not, and to em loy the
women who demand- work, and who, not employed, would suffer
physical or moral ruin, and to pay the commanded wage.
But, in view of the tendency of the courts, we must say
that the act in question was as respects the Federal Constitution,
not unconstitutional.
Reversed.

